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Cutting the Fourth Amendment Loose from
Its Moorings: The Unconstitutional Use of
FISA Evidence in Ordinary Criminal
Prosecutions
by KATHLYN QUERUBIN*
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.... [I]f
the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.... [T]o declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
-Justice Louis D. Brandeis'
Introduction
Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
several journalists and senators claimed that intelligence agencies
failed to "connect the dots" and thwart the attacks.2 Although law
enforcement and intelligence agencies had information on some of
the hijackers and the possibility of using planes as weapons prior to
September 11, critics charged that these agencies failed to share and
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
magna cum laude, 2003, Politics and History, University of San Francisco. The author
wishes to thank the editorial staff at the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their
hard work; Professor Peter Keane for his inspiration and guidance, Barry and Janet
Portman for their expert counsel, and Jose and Rosario Querubin for their tremendous
support. The author also extends special thanks to Daniel Portman, whose unwavering
encouragement made this Note and many other things possible.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See Richard Cohen, The Terrorism Story-And How We Blew It, WASH. POST,
Oct. 4, 2001, at A31; Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenballs, How He'll Haunt Us, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 31, 2001, at 14.
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coordinate information among themselves in a way that could have
prevented the tragedy that followed.3  Congress responded to these
charges with unprecedented speed. On October 2, 2001, only a few
weeks after the attacks, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
(R-Wisc.) introduced a bill that purported to improve cooperation
between law enforcement and intelligence communities to combat
terrorism.' The bill would later become known. as the USA
PATRIOT ACT ("Patriot Act").'
The Patriot Act amended several existing statutes including the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"). 6 FISA had
been originally enacted to impose Fourth Amendment protective
procedures on the government's power to conduct electronic
surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.7 In
order to get judicial authorization to conduct electronic surveillance,
FISA required the investigatory agents to demonstrate to a special
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") judge that "the
purpose" of their intended surveillance was the collection of foreign
intelligence information, as opposed to ordinary law enforcement.8
Courts have interpreted this provision to require the government to
demonstrate that foreign intelligence was the "primary purpose" of
the FISA investigation.9 Thus, FISA ensured that traditional criminal
3. David Rogers & David Cloud, Poor Cooperation May Have Delayed Moussaoui
Search, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2002, at A8.
4. Edel Hughes, Entrenched Emergencies and the "War on Terror": Time to Reform
the Derogation Procedure in International Law?, 20 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2007).
5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act] (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22,
28, 31, 47, and 50 U.S.C.).
6. Originally enacted as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-511, §§ 103, 104(a)(7)(A)-(C), 92 Stat. 1783, 1788-89 (1978) [hereinafter FISA]
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2006)). Although FISA authorizes the
Executive to conduct physical searches, as well as electronic surveillance with judicial
authorization from a special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, this Note only
examines the portions of FISA that regulate electronic surveillance in the United States.
7. William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1214-15 (2007)
(lamenting that the central premise of FISA-"authorizing secret electronic surveillance
for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, but subjecting applications to judicial
scrutiny and the entire process to congressional oversight"-was lost after it was amended
by the Patriot Act).
8. See FISA, supra note 6. The amended version of FISA only requires that the
government demonstrate that "the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power" and that the collection of foreign intelligence information
is a "significant purpose" of the investigation. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(3)(A) (2006).
9. See infra Part I.C.2.
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procedure-which requires probable cause to obtain a warrant-
would be followed when ordinary law enforcement," and not foreign
intelligence, was the primary purpose of the electronic surveillance."
The Patriot Act amended FISA 2 by eliminating the requirement
that the government demonstrate that foreign intelligence
surveillance is the "primary purpose" of the surveillance. 3 Under the
amended FISA, the government may conduct electronic surveillance
even when gathering foreign intelligence is merely a "significant
purpose" of the surveillance. 4 The Patriot Act also expressly permits
intelligence officers and law enforcement agencies to consult and
coordinate information to investigate or protect against terrorist
activity.'" Whereas FISA originally restricted electronic surveillance
to the investigation of foreign agents, these amendments allow the
government to conduct FISA surveillance even when ordinary
domestic criminal prosecution-and not foreign intelligence
gathering-is its primary objective.' 6  The information gathered
through FISA surveillance could then be used against criminal
defendants charged with a crime that is unrelated to foreign
intelligence. 7
In sum, the Patriot Act's amendments to FISA eradicated
warrant and probable cause requirements for searches and seizures
when the primary purpose of surveillance is ordinary law
enforcement. FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, became exactly
what the original legislation was intended not to be: an alternative to
10. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "ordinary crimes" or "ordinary criminal
prosecutions" will refer to those crimes or prosecutions that are unrelated to foreign
intelligence, national security, or terrorism.
11. Banks, supra note 7, at 1241.
12. Although Congress amended FISA several times, first in 2001 and again in 2004,
2007 and 2008, the later amendments do not affect the problem addressed by this Note.
Accordingly, the amendments to FISA discussed here were enacted in 2001.
13. Although Congress amended FISA several times, first in 2001 and again in 2004,
2007 and 2008, the later amendments do not affect the problem addressed by this Note.
Accordingly, the amendments to FISA discussed here were enacted in 2001.
14. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B),1805(a)(3)(A) (2006).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1)(A)-(C) (2006) (expressly permitting federal officers gathering
intelligence under FISA to "consult with Federal law enforcement officers . . . to
coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against" sabotage, international terrorism,
espionage or other grave hostile acts by foreign powers or their agents).
16. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 613 (Foreign Intel.Surv.Ct. 2002) [hereinafter In re All Matters].
17. William Pollak, Shu'ubiyya or Security? Preserving Civil Liberties by Limiting
FISA Evidence to National Security Prosecutions, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 221,222-23 (2008).
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traditional criminal procedure, circumventing constitutional
requirements in order to build a criminal case against a domestic
defendant with slight or non-existent ties to a foreign power.18
Through the amended FISA's new grant of authority to the Executive
to conduct such sweeping surveillance, Congress has reincarnated the
reviled general warrants of the eighteenth century.
This Note argues that the use of evidence procured through
FISA surveillance against defendants charged with crimes unrelated
to the purpose of the FISA authorization-that is, foreign intelligence
gathering-violates the Fourth Amendment because the seizure and
subsequent use of the evidence goes beyond the scope of a
constitutionally permitted search. Under the amended FISA, the
executive is required to certify that foreign intelligence is a
"significant purpose" of the surveillance.'9 Thus, the use of evidence
gathered during the FISA surveillance in ordinary criminal
prosecutions-which are, by definition, unrelated to this "significant
purpose"-demonstrates that the scope of such a warrant is
unreasonably broad.
This Note then proposes a solution: the return of the mere
evidence rule as a limit on the use of FISA evidence in ordinary
criminal prosecutions. The mere evidence rule, articulated by the
Supreme Court in Gouled v. United States in 1921, once defined the
constitutional scope of a search and seizure.° Under this rule, law
enforcement officials were not permitted to search and seize items
solely for the purpose of acquiring evidence-"mere evidence"-to
be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding.2' Rather, law
enforcement officials could only legally search and seize contraband
22
or instrumentalities or fruits of a crime.
When applied to FISA cases, this rule would serve as a judicial
tool to strike the balance between the government's interest in law
enforcement and the individual's right to privacy. Under this rule,
any evidence unrelated to foreign intelligence purpose of the FISA
warrant would constitute "mere evidence" and would be suppressed.
By suppressing such evidence, the rule would deter government
18. Banks, supra note 7, at 1215.
19. See supra note 8.
20. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
21. Id. at 299.
22. Id. at 309.
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overreaching and compensate the individual for the violation of his or
her constitutional rights.
Part I of this Note examines the history of electronic surveillance
jurisprudence, analyzes the Supreme Court decisions that led to the
enactment of FISA, and discusses the Patriot Act's amendments to
FISA. Part II frames the constitutional problem posed by the
amendments. Part III analyzes the constitutional argument against
using the fruits of FISA surveillance against defendants charged with
ordinary crimes. Part IV proposes that a limit on the use of FISA
evidence be imposed in the form of the mere evidence rule, and
discusses the recent en banc Ninth Circuit opinion that applies a
similar rule, albeit in a different context, to address a problem similar
to the one discussed in this Note.
I. The History of National Security Surveillance
A. The Origins of the Fourth Amendment and Its Application to
National Security Surveillance
1. The Birth of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
clearly expresses the Framers' wish to keep private homes free from
government invasion.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
and things to be seized.23
The Fourth Amendment was the constitutional protection
against the evils of the general warrant-a British procedure,
sanctioned by law, whereby writ-bearing agents of the Crown broke
down the doors of suspected dissidents in order to perform searches."
These searches were not constrained, as authorities were generally
free to "break into any shop or place suspected" and seize anything.'
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle:
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q.
371,372 (1980).
25. Id. at 381 (quoting a 1621 Privy Council general warrant).
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The general warrants were used to intimidate dissidents, authors, and
printers of seditious materials.2 ' They were used to enforce excise
laws and seize excised goods, enforce customs laws,2 and impose
taxes.29
The English methods of search and seizure were used just as
frequently in the American colonies as they were in Britain. °
Through writs of assistance-the colonial equivalent of the general
warrant-authorities stormed through homes searching for taxable
goods and contraband, and arresting escaped slaves and vagrants.3' In
many respects, the searches in America were more invasive than
those in England because the British colonial government, which
established the writs, generally discarded whatever few restraints
32there were on the general warrant . As the searches grew more
common and more invasive,33  the colonists reacted violently,
frequently responding to the searches by barring doors with axes and
attacking the searchers with weapons.34 Because colonial law failed to
recognize a right of individual privacy, the colonists had no legal
remedy for the invasion.3"
Against this backdrop, the Founding Fathers crafted a
constitution that would recognize the civil liberties largely ignored by
the British crown. On June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed
language to the Constitutional Convention that became the Fourth
26. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1067 (1765), available at
http://www.constitution.org/trials/entick/entick v-carrington.htm.
27. Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 24, at 383 (describing the usage of general warrants
to impose taxes as "absolutely intolerable to private persons," and introducing dangerous
precedent: "the practice of using general warrants would proliferate until the excise laws
reached 'the domestic concerns of every private family, and.., every species of produce in
the land."').
28. Id. at 384 (describing writs of assistance for customs authorities that "permitted
bearers of such writs to 'enter and goe into any house, shop, celler, warehouse, or roome
or other place, and in case of Resistance . . . to break open doores, chests, truncks, and
other packages,' and to seize and impound illegal goods.").
29. Id. (A 1688 tax law authorized tax collectors "'to breake open in the day-time any
House and upon Warrant . . . any chest, Trunck, or Box' containing tax-able articles.
Similar powers were granted by statutes affecting military recruitment, naval impressment,
and bankruptcy.").
30. Id. at 388.
31. Id. at 390.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 391-92.
34. Id.
35. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
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Amendment.36 The Convention, mindful of the evils of the writs of
assistance, required specificity for warrants to search and seize. Over
one hundred and seventy years later, the United States Supreme
Court would require that same specificity in electronic invasions of
privacy.37
2. The United States' Long History of Spying on Its Citizens
The history of government surveillance for the purpose of
gathering intelligence stretches to the early days of the Revolutionary
War, when the Continental Congress established the Committee for
Secret Correspondence and enacted the first espionage legislation,
which made it a capital crime for "all persons... [to be] found lurking
as spies."38 President George Washington, recalling his experience as
an analyst and spymaster in the Revolutionary War, specifically
requested funds for intelligence operations during his first State of the
Union Address.39 Congress complied. ' Most of the presidents after
Washington followed his model and assumed responsibility for covert
foreign intelligence actions.' For the most part, Congress deferred to
the President, believing that such power was vested in the Executive.42
In the 1930s, as the country prepared for war, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), under the direction of J. Edgar
Hoover, started using electronic surveillance for national security
purposes.43 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt authorized J. Edgar
Hoover to gather intelligence on persons "detrimental to the security
of the United States," with a special emphasis on targeting individuals
36. Id.
37. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967) (holding that a warrant,
authorized by a neutral magistrate and possessing the required specificity and
particularity, must be obtained before law enforcement officials can conduct electronic
surveillance of a telephone conversation in a phone booth, even when officials have
probable cause to believe that a crime is being or will be conducted); Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966) (holding that, under sufficiently "precise and
discriminate circumstances," a federal court may authorize government officials to use a
concealed electronic device "for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the
truth of allegations" of a "detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific
criminal offense").
38. Banks & Bowman, supra note 35, at 11-12.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 26.
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suspected of espousing fascism or communism.' This unfettered
executive power to gather intelligence in the name of national
security expanded virtually unabated until the early 1970s.45 By then,
the FBI files were thick with personal information on private
individuals, and the changing political climate brought public outcry
at the activities of the intelligence community. 6
In response to public pressure, Congress began to investigate
intelligence activities in the United States. In 1975, the Senate
commissioned the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (known as the
"Church Committee," after its Chair, Senator Frank Church). 47 The
Church Committee found that every President since Roosevelt had
violated individual privacy by conducting secret electronic
surveillance without prior judicial approval.48 Many targets of the
surveillance were never suspected of criminal activity and were
targeted solely for beliefs protected under the First Amendment. 9
For example, the Church Committee revealed that the government
conducted warrantless surveillance of Martin Luther King and other
civil rights leaders, as well as Vietnam War dissenters. ° Following the
Church Committee's report, Congress started regulating intelligence
gathering."
3. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Electronic Surveillance
Problems arise, however, when attempting to apply the Fourth
Amendment-originally designed to combat overreaching searches in
ordinary criminal law-to the area of national security surveillance,
which seeks to address threats to our national security not
contemplated at the time of its enactment. The Fourth Amendment
is implicated by national security investigations because the methods
used to investigate criminal enterprises are also used in gathering
44. Id.
45. Id. at 32-34.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 33; see Elizabeth Gillingham Daily, Comment, Beyond 'Persons, Houses,
Papers, and Effects': Rewriting the Fourth Amendment for National Security Surveillance,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 641, 645 (2006).
48. Daily, supra note 47, at 645.
49. Id. at 654.
50. Id.
51. Id.
[Vol. 37:2
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF FISA EVIDENCE
intelligence.52 Furthermore, the fact that information gathered during
the course of a national security investigation may be turned over to
officials for use in an ordinary criminal prosecution and introduced as
evidence against a criminal defendant also implicates the Fourth
Amendment. 3
Despite the information overlap, national security investigations
and ordinary law enforcement investigations are distinct creatures:
each one serves a different purpose and protects different interests. 4
Ordinary law enforcement, through a criminal investigation, seeks to
root out individual criminals and bring them to justice.5
Furthermore, before electronic surveillance in the form of Fourth
Amendment searches or seizures can take place, law enforcement
officials must demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that they have
probable cause to believe that their surveillance will expose evidence
of a crime."
On the other hand, national security investigations target general
threats to national security and are based on standards much lower
than the probable cause required in criminal investigations. 7 In order
to stay one step ahead of an attack, national security investigations
are undertaken before any criminal activity begins. 8 The purpose of
such investigations is to prevent "unlawful activity or [enhance] the
[g]overnment's preparedness for some possible future crisis or
emergency," and not necessarily to secure a conviction for actual
criminal activity. 9  Thus, the focus of intelligence gathering for
national security purposes, "may be less precise"-and, as a result,
more sweeping-"than that directed against more conventional types
of crime."6°
Because of these fundamental differences, courts have been
more willing to bypass Fourth Amendment scrutiny in the area of
national security than in the area of ordinary law enforcement.6 Such
52. Banks & Bowman, supra note 35, at 4.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 8.
59. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., (Keith) 407 U.S. 297,322 (1972).
60. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
61. Id. at 308, 321-22 (recognizing that there is no "question or doubt as to the
necessity of obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national
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leniency in the area of criminal procedure, especially when involving
a foreign power or its agents, is grounded on the belief that a
traditional warrant acquired from a neutral magistrate, as required by
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,62 might "unduly
frustrate the efforts of government to protect itself from acts of
subversion and overthrow directed at it."'63  In addition, as the
Supreme Court recognized, the nature of intelligence gathering
requires stealth and secrecy. 6' Consequently, traditional notice
requirements of Rule 41 could undermine the purpose of the national
security surveillance, as would the requirements of probable cause
and particularity. 6 Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
traditional warrant required in ordinary law enforcement may not
apply in national security surveillance.6  Lower courts have also
deferred to the President's designation as "the pre-eminent authority
in [the area of] foreign affairs" and permitted warrantless searches in
61
cases involving a foreign power or its agents.
B. The Court's Role
The concept that the Fourth Amendment protects the right to
privacy in addition to property first appeared at the end of the
nineteenth century in Boyd v. United States.6 Boyd involved the
seizure of the defendant's papers-tangible, private property which
the government sought to introduce as evidence against the
defendant. 69 The Court held that the defendant's private papers were
protected from search and seizure by the Fourth (and Fifth)
Amendments because unless the government had a higher claim to
the property in question-for example, if the government had
probable cause to believe that the property was stolen or
contraband-the government had no right to seize it.7°
security interest," but that national security surveillance may involve "different policy and
practical considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime"').
62. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
63. Keith, 407 U.S. at 315.
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id. at 322 (noting that the same types of standards and procedures prescribed by
Title III need not necessarily be applicable in foreign intelligence gathering cases).
66. Id.
67. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980).
68. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Forty years later, in 1928, the Court denied an appeal to extend
the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy to a case that did not
involve physical property.7 In Olmstead v. United States, the Court
held that the government's electronic surveillance of the defendant
was not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment because
there was no actual physical invasion of the defendant's house. The
words of the Fourth Amendment itself, the Court reasoned, "show
that the search is to be of material things-the person, his house, his
papers, or his effects."" Because the government avoided any
trespass on the defendant's property by wiretapping the phone lines
using wires outside his house, the Fourth Amendment was not
implicated.74
In his vigorous dissent, Justice Brandeis cautioned against
adopting too literal an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.7 He
argued that the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
were "much broader in scope" than the majority had defined,76
Rather than only protecting persons, papers, houses, and effects,
[t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
71. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928).
72. Id. at 464.
73. Id. at 466 (noting that no federal court has held that the Fourth Amendment had
been violated "unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his
house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure").
74. Id. at 466 ("The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and
that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the protected voices
were not in the house of either party to the conversation.").
75. Id. at 472-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 478.
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means emplorved, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Brandeis further argued that the Fourth Amendment
must also extend to the "subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy [that] have become available to the government. ,78
The Constitution is "not [an] ephemeral enactment[], designed to
meet passing occasions. ' ' 79  Rather, it is "designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it."80 The
Court, when interpreting the Constitution, must contemplate not
"only... what has been but. . . what may be."81 A flexible reading of
the Constitution is vital to dealing with the invasions of "the
sanctit[ies] of a man's home and the privacies of life" by methods yet
unknown and unforeseen.82
Despite Justice Brandeis's powerful rhetoric, the Olmstead
majority's narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's reach
remained the law when applied to the government's use of electronic
surveillance until the Court reversed itself in Katz v. United States.83
In Katz, the Court held that Fourth Amendment protections apply to
electronic surveillance.' The Fourth Amendment "extends as well to
the recording of oral statements overheard without any 'technical
trespass.., under local property law."'8' Overturning the holding in
Olmstead, the Court rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment
applied only to unreasonable search and seizure of tangible items:
"the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
77. Id.
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). In espousing a flexible reading of the Constitution, Brandeis cautioned that
"'time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.' Subtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government.
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered
in the closet." Id.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-53.
84. Id. at 353.
85. Id. (citation omitted).
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enclosure."' 6 Instead, the principal factor in whether an act of the
government constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment lay not in the physical location of the action, but in
whether the individual had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
the circumstances.87
Although the Court's decision limited the government's ability to
conduct electronic surveillance, the Court refused to address the
power of the executive to conduct electronic surveillance for national
security purposes." In his concurrence, Justice White argued that
there should be an exception to the warrant requirement for national
security surveillance. 9 On the other hand, Justice Douglas, who
concurred in the judgment, wrote a separate concurrence to address
the words of Justice White.90 According to Justice Douglas, Justice
White's espousal of an exception to the warrant requirement for
national security was a "wholly unwarranted green light for the
Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping in cases which
the Executive Branch itself labels 'national security' matters."91 The
warrant requirement should most certainly apply in those situations
because neither the President nor the Attorney General is "detached,
disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be." Rather,
they are "properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in
national security cases. '9 Justice Douglas' rejection of an exception
to the warrant requirement for national security matters arguably
supports the view that the courts play a vital role in mediating
between the competing interests of law enforcement and the privacy
of the individuals targeted by national security wiretaps.94 These two
competing views persist to this day in the debate over national
security surveillance.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 358 n.23 (majority opinion) ("Whether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation
involving national security is a question not presented by this case.").
89. Id. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require the warrant
procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his chief
legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirement of national security
and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.").
90. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 360.
94. Id.
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C. Congressional Regulation of Electronic Surveillance and the
Diminishing Role of the Courts
1. Title III and the Keith Case
After Katz, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III") to regulate the use
of electronic surveillance in law enforcement investigations. 9 Title III
established a warrant procedure that closely tracked the Court's
ruling in Katz. For example, Title III requires a law enforcement
officer to submit an oath or affirmation to a judge96 describing the
facts giving rise to "probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense." ' The judge must also find probable cause to believe that
surveillance is necessary to obtain evidence of a crime, and that the
facility being targeted by surveillance is being used in connection with
the crime or by the person suspected of the crime.98 Finally, the judge
must determine that "normal investigative procedures" other than
electronic surveillance were unsuccessful or unreasonable.99 Only
then will the judge grant a surveillance warrant.1°°
The statute also contains several provisions that minimize the
invasion of privacy even after the warrant is issued. For example,
surveillance orders are limited to thirty days, although an extension
may be granted upon re-application. °' Furthermore, the target of the
surveillance must be notified of the surveillance within ninety days of
its termination. 2 This notice requirement is significant because, as
discussed below, the notice requirements for FISA differ
significantly."'
However, Congress explicitly exempted foreign surveillance
from the limits imposed on ordinary law enforcement investigations
by Title III. The statute specifically states that:
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2518 (2006).
96. § 2518(1).
97. § 2518(3)(a). The statute further requires that the suspected crime be one of
those enumerated under section 2516(1). Id.
98. § 2518(3)(b)-(d).
99. § 2518(3)(c).
100. § 2518(3). The statute further requires that the suspected crime be one of those
enumerated under section 2516(1). Id.
101. § 2518(5).
102. § 2518(8)(d).
103. See infra Part I.C.3.
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Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as
he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as
he deems necessary to protect the Unites States against the
overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful
means, or against any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government.
In United States v. United States District Court-commonly
known as the Keith case° 5-the Supreme Court applied the Fourth
Amendment to domestic surveillance.1°6 The Court held that the
government may not conduct domestic surveillance, electronic or
otherwise, without a warrant.' °7
In Keith, the government charged one of the defendants with the
bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan."l During the trial,
the government admitted that it had conducted warrantless electronic
surveillance of the defendant, but argued that it was nonetheless legal
because the purpose of the surveillance-"to gather intelligence
information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of
Government"-justified an exception to the warrant requirement.
The Court rejected the government's argument and held that the facts
of Keith did "not justify complete exemption of domestic security
104. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., (Keith) 407 U.S. 297,302-03 (1972) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(3) (1976), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978).
105. The title of this case, Keith, "is taken from the name of then-United States
District Court Judge Damon Keith. Interestingly, Judge Keith was not the original judge
in the case. 'The case was originally assigned to United [States] District Court Judge
Talbot Smith, but was randomly reassigned to Judge Keith when Smith recused himself for
personal reasons."' Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance
Program and the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement: Lessons From Justice Powell
and the Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) (citation omitted).
106. Keith, 407 U.S. at 297.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 299.
109. Id. at 300.
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surveillance from prior judicial scrutiny.". When conducting
electronic surveillance for domestic security purposes, the Court held,
the Fourth Amendment requires that the government first seek
judicial approval from a neutral magistrate. il
The Court reached this conclusion by balancing the
government's duty "to protect the domestic security [against] the
potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual
privacy and free expression. ' ' 112 The Court established a frameworkto guide lower courts' determination of the issue:
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic
security requires the use of electronic surveillance, the question
is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and [the] free
expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant
before such surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask
whether a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the
efforts of [the] Government to protect itself from acts of
subversion and overthrow directed against it."3
While recognizing the "constitutional basis of the President's
domestic security role," the Court held that it "must [nonetheless] be
exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment."'' 4
By requiring a warrant prior to initiating surveillance, the risk of
violating individual privacy and freedom of expression would be
avoided."5
The Court, however, limited its holding in two ways. First, it
noted that its decision in Keith involved only "the domestic aspects of
national security," and refused to address "the issues which may be
involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents."'' 6
Second, the Court stated that although the Fourth Amendment
requires the government to obtain a warrant prior to initiating
surveillance for national security purposes, "domestic security
110. Id. at 320.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 315.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 320.
115. Id. at 318 ("Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested
means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.").
116. Id. at 321-22.
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surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations
from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime.',
117
The Court's limiting words are important because they created a
distinction between surveillance for the purpose of gathering
information on domestic threats to national security and surveillance
for information on ordinary crime which previously did not exist.'18
The Court stopped short of offering real guidance, however, in failing
to define the distinction in terms of the type of threat required or the
government interest involved. Furthermore, although the Court
permitted a warrant requirement for domestic security surveillance,
which was different from those required by Title III," 9 the Court did
not specify what type of differences would be constitutionally
permissible.2
2. Applying Keith to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and the Birth of
the Primary Purpose Test
Most federal circuit courts of appeal interpreted the hole left by
the Supreme Court in Keith to mean that foreign intelligence
surveillance, unlike domestic security surveillance, justified an
exception to the warrant requirement. 2 ' The most prominent case
117. Id. at 322.
118. See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and The
Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
319, 331 (2005).
119. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322 ("[W]e do not hold that the same type of standards and
procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case.").
120. See Seamon & Gardner, supra note 118, at 332 ("[T]he Keith opinion suggests that
the Fourth Amendment varies in stringency, requiring the most strict procedures and
standards for electronic surveillance of 'ordinary crime' (the subject of Title III); less strict
procedures and standards-which nonetheless generally include prior judicial approval-
for electronic surveillance for information related to domestic threats to national security
(the subject of Keith itself); and the least strict procedures and standards for electronic
surveillance for foreign threats to national security (the context as to which the Keith
Court expressly reserved decision).").
121. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment permits warrantless surveillance as long as in camera review reveals
that the purpose of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence information); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
permits warrantless surveillance as long as its sole purpose is to gather foreign intelligence
information and any retention of evidence of criminal activity is incidental); United States
v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits
warrantless surveillance so long as the purpose of the surveillance is to gather intelligence
information).
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addressing this issue is United States v. Truong Dinh Hung.2 In
Truong, the defendant, an American citizen, was convicted of
transmitting classified information to representatives of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam during the 1977 Paris negotiations between that
country and the United States." The defendant moved to suppress
the prosecution's use of evidence gained through warrantless
electronic surveillance on the ground that it constituted an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.'24  The
government argued that the special circumstances of foreign
intelligence justified a warrant exception to the Fourth
Amendment.'
The district court accepted the government's argument that the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement contained an exception
for the collection of foreign intelligence. 6 However, the court held
that the exception should be limited to those cases where the
Executive was conducting "primarily" a foreign intelligence
investigation.'27 Accordingly, the district court admitted evidence
against the defendant that was gathered "during the period the
investigation primarily concerned foreign intelligence," but excluded
evidence when it determined that the investigation became "primarily
a criminal investigation. ' 8
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.9  Using the Keith balancing
framework, the Truong court found that the needs of the Executive
"are so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence, unlike the area
of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would...
'unduly frustrate' the President in carrying out his foreign affairs
responsibilities.' 3 But recognizing that individual privacy rights are
severely compromised when the government conducts surveillance
without judicial authorization, the court stressed that the foreign
122. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980).
Although Truong was decided after the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 ("FISA"), the government surveillance took place in 1977, so the court did not
apply FISA.
123. Id. at 911-12.
124. Id. at 912.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 912-13.
128. Id. at 913.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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intelligence exception to the warrant requirement was limited to
those cases where the government's interests "are paramount..'.. The
government's interests are "paramount"-that is, they are so
compelling that it should be relieved of seeking a warrant-only when
two conditions are met: First, when "the object of the search or the
surveillance is a foreign power, its agents or collaborators"; and
second, when the surveillance is conducted "primarily for foreign
intelligence reasons. ' ,132 These conditions ensured that even foreign
actors and their agents would "receive the protection of the warrant
requirement if the government is primarily attempting to put together
a[n] [ordinary] criminal prosecution.
133
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished between
warrantless surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence and surveillance for the purpose of ordinary criminal
prosecution."4 First, unlike an ordinary criminal investigation, foreign
intelligence surveillance entails "the utmost stealth, speed, and
secrecy.' '135  Requiring the President to obtain a warrant before
conducting surveillance would risk delaying the response to terrorist
threats and leaking of sensitive information.'36 Second, the judiciary is
not competent in the field of intelligence and should defer to the
Executive's expertise.' 37  Finally, the Executive not only has the
expertise, but has been "constitutionally designated as the pre-
eminent authority in foreign affairs.' ' 8  Thus, the special
circumstances surrounding foreign intelligence justified a departure
from traditional Fourth Amendment principles.
The Truong court's decision came to be known as the "primary
purpose test,"'39 which played an important role in national security
jurisprudence, even after the enactment of FISA.
131. Id. at 915.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 916.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 913.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 914.
139. Seamon & Gardner, supra note 118, at 364-64 (noting that Truong "deserves
credit as the progenitor of the 'primary purpose' test that became associated with the FISA").
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3. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
In 1978, in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the Church
Committee reports, the Ninety-Fifth Congress enacted the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to regulate the Executive Branch's use
of electronic surveillance.140 Using the Supreme Court's very words
from Keith, FISA authorized the government to conduct electronic
surveillance of "foreign powers" and "agents of foreign powers" for
"the purpose" of gathering "foreign intelligence information" so long
as the government received prior judicial approval.14 ' FISA thus
established a new court, called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("FISC"), whose sole jurisdiction is limited to hearing
applications and granting orders for electronic surveillance of such
foreign powers. 142  FISA also established an appellate court, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR"), whose
sole jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the denial of any FISA
application. 143 The FISCR has heard only one case in the history of its
existence."
Although FISA established some limitations on the
government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance, it differed
markedly from Title III procedures. The most glaring difference was
140. Id. at 337.
141. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518-19 (2000)), amended by
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-11, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2518-19). In 2001, the Patriot Act amended
FISA to require that applicants certify that "a significant purpose"-instead of "the
purpose"--of the surveillance is gathering foreign intelligence information. Foreign
intelligence information is:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against -
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage [or] international terrorism ... by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates
to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to -
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2006).
142. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006).
143. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
144. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
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FISA's departure from the traditional warrant requirements
implemented by Congress in Title III to comply with the Fourth
Amendment. Under Title III, a court will issue a warrant for
electronic surveillance only when the government demonstrates that
there is probable cause that a crime has occurred, and that a
particular individual was involved . Title III's probable cause
requirement discouraged the government from using electronic
surveillance to investigate persons for whom the government lacked
probable cause-or even reasonable suspicion-of criminal activity.
FISA, however, requires only that a federal officer certify that the
target is a foreign power or its agent, and that "a significant purpose
of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information" that
cannot be obtained through normal investigative techniques.146
Another difference between FISA and traditional Title III
procedures is the extent to which the reviewing judge may challenge
and evaluate the substance of the federal officer's certification,
probing for illegalities or insufficiencies. FISA requires the FISC to
approve an order for surveillance "as requested or as modified" if the
court determines that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power
or agent of a foreign power. 147 The FISC judge may not review the
agent's certification that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information.148 It does so only if the target of the
surveillance is a U.S. citizen, and, even then, the court will review the
government's certification of a foreign intelligence purpose for clear
error only.149  The clear error standard is so deferential to the
government that judges have interpreted it to discourage them from
second guessing the government's claims of a foreign intelligence
purpose.5 This deference has also led courts to largely ignore the
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2006). Title III also requires that the applicant was
unsuccessful at all other investigative techniques before seeking a surveillance warrant, §
2518(3)(c), which is absent in FISA. Title III thus requires the government to use
electronic surveillance only as a last resort when all other investigatory techniques have
failed. See § 2518(1)(c) (requiring the Title III warrant application to state "a full and
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried
and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous").
146. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2006).
147. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (a)(3)(A)-(B) (2006).
148. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5).
149. Id.
150. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
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exclusionary rule in FISA cases,' and to refuse to suppress FISA
evidence even when falsehoods in the FISA application were
exposed.152 The judiciary was thus relegated to the task of merely
evaluating whether the FISA application complied with the statutory
requirements.
Finally, FISA differed from Title III in terms of the length of the
surveillance and of the notice requirements. Under Title III,
surveillance was limited to thirty days,'53 while FISA surveillance may
be authorized for up to one hundred twenty days."' Furthermore,
Title III requires that targets be notified of the surveillance ninety
days after termination of the surveillance,'5 while FISA targets are
provided notice after-the-fact only if the intercepted communications
are sought to be admitted in a criminal proceeding."6 Despite this
right to limited after-the-fact disclosure, defendants have been unable
to mount an adequate motion to exclude because they do not have
access to the government's information that led to its application for
surveillance, contained in materials such as the application itself, the
151. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(g) (2006) ("If the United States district court pursuant to
subsection (f) of this section determines that the surveillance was not lawfully authorized
or conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of law, suppress the evidence
which was unlawfully obtained or derived from electronic surveillance of the aggrieved
person or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person. If the court determines that
the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion of the
aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure.").
But see United States v. Mazook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788-91 (N.D. Il1. 2006) (refusing to
suppress evidence obtained during physical search of defendant's home which was
unauthorized by the version of FISA in force at the time); United States v. Bin Laden, 126
F. Supp. 2d 264, 282-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S7R
98CR1023KTD, 2005 WL 287404, at *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (FISA evidence
admissible despite government's failure to obtain proper authorization from Attorney
General until eight months into surveillance); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 839-
40 (2d Cir. 1980) (refusing to suppress evidence from unlawful surveillance on ground that
exclusionary rule did not apply).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Daly, Nos. 05-10718, 05-10719, 05-10728, 05-10729, 2007
WL 2212362, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007) ("Even if the statements that [defendant] points
to in the affidavit supporting the search warrant for his home and office were false, he
failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit's remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause.").
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006).
154. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1) (2006).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
156. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(3), 1806(c)-(d). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) and §2516(1)
with § 1806(f)-(g) (2006). Also, the FISC meets in secret, at an undisclosed location, and
does not publish its decisions and its orders are sealed. § 1806(f).
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certification, and affidavits.'57 Indeed, not a single defendant has been
able to successfully challenge a FISA application because courts have
refused to order the disclosure of a FISA application to a criminal
defendant. "'
The lower courts are split on whether FISA procedures comply
with the Fourth Amendment. Some courts have held that the FISA
procedures meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements of judicial
authorization and particularity. For example, in United States v.
Sarkissian, the Ninth Circuit held that compliance with FISA
procedures satisfied the Fourth Amendment and cautioned against
drawing too fine a distinction between investigations for criminal
purposes as opposed to investigations for foreign intelligence
purposes, because one inherently involved the other.' On the other
hand, in United States v. Duggan, the Second Circuit adhered to the
primary purpose test of Truong, holding that electronic surveillance
complied with the Fourth Amendment only when the primary
purpose of the investigation was foreign intelligence."6
4. The Primary Purpose Test Evolves into 'The Wall'
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") adhered to the primary
purpose test, which it interpreted as prohibiting criminal prosecutors
from directing or controlling FISA investigations.16' Thus, the DOJ
adopted procedures that limited contact between federal foreign
intelligence agents and federal prosecutors, fearing that
communications between the intelligence officers and federal
prosecutors would lead courts to exclude evidence on the ground that
157. See John D. McKinnon, Volatile Formula: How Patriot Act Helped Convict Man
in Baby-Food Ring-Mr. Jammal Faces 10 Years After Terror-Probe Tapes Are Used in
Criminal Trial-A 14-Minute Rant Against U.S., WALL ST. J., April 4, 2006, at Al
("Armed with a [FISA] warrant, authorities can eavesdrop on any conversation,
regardless of whether it involves a crime. They can withhold from defendants the basis for
issuing the warrant, hindering legal challenges to the FISA evidence. And they can restrict
defendants' access to the classified transcripts and tapes, which makes it harder for the
defense to parry the government's charges or mount its own case.").
158. See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003 WL 22137012, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2003) (listing cases where the courts have not ordered disclosure of the FISA
application materials).
159. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1988).
160. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1984).
161. Seamon & Gardner, supra note 118, at 383-84.
___
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the purpose of the investigation was primarily criminal prosecution.162
These restrictions eventually became known as "the wall.'
163
The wall attracted public and Congressional attention after the
terrorist attacks of September 11.14 The media reported that
intelligence and law enforcement agencies had information that they
had failed to share among themselves in a way that might have
prevented the attacks. Congress hastily passed The Patriot Act in
part to tear down the wall once and for all, by amending FISA to
require only that the gathering of foreign intelligence information
must be "a significant purpose"-as opposed to "the purpose"-of
the surveillance.66 FISA also authorized foreign intelligence officers
to consult and coordinate with federal law enforcement officers.'67
The DOJ interpreted the Patriot Act amendments to mean that it was
now permitted to conduct FISA surveillance even when the
investigation was primarily concerned with ordinary criminal
prosecution, so long as foreign intelligence gathering remained "a
significant purpose. 1 68  Based on this interpretation, the DOJ
established new "Intelligence Sharing Procedures," which permitted
extensive information-sharing between "the FBI and the Criminal
Division regarding, among other things, "the initiation, operation,
continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or surveillance."' 69 The
FISC rejected the new procedures offered by the DOJ, holding-in a
rare public opinion that was issued pursuant to an appeal-that the
Patriot Act's amendments to FISA did not intend to destroy the
wall. 70
5. FISCR Finally Tears Down 'The Wall'
The DOJ's appeal of the FISC's ruling was the FISCR's first and,
to this day, only case. 7' The issue before the FISCR was whether the
162. Id. at 323.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 323-24.
165. See Rogers & Cloud, supra note 3.
166. Seamon & Gardner, supra note 118, at 324. See also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(b) (2006).
167. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) (2006).
168. Seamon & Gardner, supra note 118, at 382.
169. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Director, FBI (Mar. 6,
2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag03/06/02.html. See also Seamon
& Gardner, supra note 118, at 382-83.
170. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623-25 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
171. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719.
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primary purpose test applied to FISA surveillance in light of the
Patriot Act's amendments to FISA.1 7 2  The court found that the
Patriot Act's "significant purpose" amendment to FISA allowed
federal prosecutors to use FISA evidence for the purpose of
prosecuting ordinary criminal activity so long as foreign intelligence
was involved. 173  Neither the Constitution nor the amended FISA
required the primary purpose test because it was based on a "false
dichotomy" between foreign intelligence information and ordinary
law enforcement evidence.1 74  Thus, if the government's purpose
"articulates a broader objective than criminal prosecution-such as
the stopping an ongoing conspiracy-and includes other potential
non-prosecutorial responses, the government meets the statutory
test.' 75
II. Framing the Problem
The consequences of the FISCR's decision are clear: There is
now virtually no difference between ordinary criminal law
enforcement and intelligence gathering. So long as the Executive can
articulate a significant foreign intelligence purpose for the
investigation, it may also use the investigation to collect evidence for
an ordinary criminal prosecution. The Executive's certification that
the surveillance is for a significant foreign intelligence purpose is not
reviewable by the FISC under any other standard than clear error.
Consequently, this lower standard creates a way around the Fourth
Amendment, allowing prosecutors to replace the higher Title III
standards with FISA, thereby avoiding Title III's constitutionally
mandated protections.
In response to this fortuitous switch, prosecutors got busy: from
2003 to 2004, "for the first time, the number of secret surveillance
warrants issued in federal terrorism and espionage cases. .. exceeded
the total number of wiretaps approved in criminal cases
nationwide.' ' 176  Even the FISC has noted that the increased
information sharing between intelligence officials and criminal
172. Id. at 720.
173. Id. at 734-35 (finding that the Patriot Act's amendments to FISA permitted
surveillance "even if 'foreign intelligence' is only a significant-not a primary-purpose").
174. Id. at 735.
175. Id.
176. Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Data Show Different Spy Game Since 9/11, WASH.
POST, May 1, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A57859
-2004Apr30?language=printer.
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prosecutors "appear[s] to be designed to amend the law and
substitute FISA for Title III electronic surveillances and [Federal]
Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 41 searches ... because the government
is unable to meet the substantive requirements of these law
enforcement tools.' 7 7  Thus, the amended FISA permits law
enforcement officials to conduct more sweeping surveillance than
under criminal law (i.e., Title III), on a lower showing of cause, and
then use the fruits of the surveillance to prosecute a defendant for
crimes unrelated to foreign intelligence.
The new FISA opens the door to potential abuse of the Fourth
Amendment by the Executive. For example, because the
requirement that the FISC find probable cause that the target is a
"foreign power" or its agent is easily satisfied,78 the new FISA makes
it easier for law enforcement officials to use national foreign
intelligence gathering pretextually, when the real goal of the
surveillance is ordinary law enforcement. Under FISA, the definition
of a "foreign power" is so broad that large swaths of the population
would fit this description-including any component of a foreign
government, a foreign political organization, or any entity that is
directed or controlled by a foreign government. 17' The "incredible
breadth" of the definitions in FISA also "include[s] definitions of
criminal behavior so broad, as to encompass any violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States... or any State." ' 8° These new
provisions make it easier for the government to prosecute minority
groups, immigrants, or political opponents merely on the basis of a
tenuous connection to a foreign power.'81 Furthermore, the courts
177. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
178. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980).
179. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2006).
180. Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of
the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1234, 1258 (2003).
181. For example, the Patriot Act's "lone wolf" provision makes any non-citizen who
is acting alone a potential "agent of a foreign power." Before Congress amended FISA to
include this provision, FISA previously required the government to show that the
activities of a target of a FISA investigation were performed "for or on behalf of" a
foreign power. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C). The "lone wolf" provision essentially
eliminated the required link between the target's activities and a foreign power or agent of
a foreign power by broadening the definition of "agent of a foreign power" to include any
non-U.S. person who "engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor." 50 U.S.C § 1801(b)(1)(C). See also Statement of US Senator Russ Feingold on
the Intelligence Reform Conference Report for the Congressional Record, (Dec. 8, 2004),
available at http://feingold.senate.gov/statements/04/12/2004CO9828.html. In his Statement
on the Intelligence Reform Conference Report for the Congressional Record, United
[Vol. 37:2
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF FISA EVIDENCE
have been deprived of their check on the Executive's certification
that foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance
and that the target is a foreign power or its agent.
182
The solution proposed by this Note is a limit on the use of
evidence that is unrelated to a significant foreign intelligence purpose.
This "use limit" would function as a rebirth of the mere evidence rule:
Unrelated "mere evidence" must be suppressed in a criminal
proceeding because the use of FISA fruits against a defendant
States Senator Russ Feingold stated that the "lone wolf" provision "eliminates the
requirement in [FISA] that surveillance or searches be carried out only against persons
suspected of being agents of foreign powers or terrorist organizations." Senator Feingold
went on to say:
Mr. President, I am troubled by some provisions that were added in conference
that have nothing to do with reforming our intelligence network. The bill
includes in section 6001 what has come to be known as the "lone wolf" provision.
The lone wolf provision eliminates the requirement in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") that surveillance or searches be carried out only
against persons suspected of being agents of foreign powers or terrorist
organizations. I am very concerned about the implications of this provision for
civil liberties in this country.
It is important to remember that FISA itself is an exception to traditional
constitutional restraints on criminal investigations, allowing the government to
gather foreign intelligence information through wiretaps and searches without
having probable cause that a crime has been or is going to be committed. The
courts have permitted the government to proceed with surveillance in this
country under FISA's lesser standard of suspicion because the power is limited to
investigations of foreign powers and their agents. This bill therefore writes out of
the statute a key requirement necessary to the lawfulness of intrusive
surveillance powers that may very well otherwise be unconstitutional.
By allowing searches or wiretaps under FISA of persons merely suspected of
engaging in or preparing to engage in terrorism, the bill essentially eliminates the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. I voted against the lone wolf bill when it
passed the Senate early in this Congress. I believe there are better and more
constitutional ways to deal with a situation where evidence of a connection to a
foreign government or terrorist organization is not easily obtained.
Even if section 6001 survives constitutional challenge, it would mean that non-
U.S. persons could have electronic surveillance and searches authorized against
them using the lesser standards of FISA even though there is no conceivable
foreign intelligence aspect to their case. This provision may very well result in a
dramatic increase in the use of FISA warrants in situations that do not justify
such extraordinary government power.
If the government comes to the conclusion that an individual is truly acting on his
or her own, then our criminal laws concerning when electronic surveillance and
searches can be used are more than sufficient. True lone wolf terrorists can and
should be investigated and prosecuted in our criminal justice system. Section
6001 allows the government to use FISA to obtain a warrant for surveillance
even if it knows that the subject has no connection whatsoever with a foreign
power or a terrorist organization. That is not right.). See also H.R. Rep. No.
108-796, (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
182. United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that it is
"not the function of the FISA court judge nor is it the function of this judge to 'second-
guess' these certifications" (citing United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984))).
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charged with ordinary crimes exceeds the scope of a legitimate FISA
search. A FISA search for unrelated evidence is analogous to the
general warrant or writs of assistance that the Fourth Amendment
was meant to stem. In making this argument, this Note advocates
that the use of evidence from a FISA search be limited to the purpose
set forth in the statute: that foreign intelligence be a "significant
purpose" of the surveillance.
IH. Constitutional Arguments for a Use Limit on Evidence Acquired
Under FISA
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the scope of a
search, whether or not it is conducted with a warrant, must strictly
comport with and be justified by the circumstances permitting its
initiation.183 Under FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, the
Executive must certify that "a significant purpose of the surveillance"
is foreign intelligence." When the government uses evidence that is
unrelated to gathering foreign intelligence in order to convict a
defendant of ordinary crime, then the Executive is conducting a
search and seizure that "violate[s] the Fourth Amendment in its
intensity and scope." '185 In this way, the collection and use of such
unrelated evidence under FISA is analogous to the general warrants
and writs of assistance of the eighteenth century that the Fourth
Amendment was specifically enacted to address. Like the general
183. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) ("The scope of a search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)));
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("The scope of a search is generally defined by
its expressed object." (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982))); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) ("If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by
the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the
warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more."); Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) ("The [Fourth] Amendment's protection is not diluted
in those situations where it has been determined that legitimate law enforcement interests
justify a warrantless search: the search must be limited in scope to that which is justified by
the particular purposes served by the exception."); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
823 (1982) ("The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower-
and no broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise
is as the magistrate could authorize."); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) ("[T]he
scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the
search from the warrant requirement."); Warden, 387 U.S. at 310 ("[W]e have refused to
permit use of articles the seizure of which could not be strictly tied to and justified by the
exigencies which excused the warrantless search.").
184. See supra Part I.C.5.
185. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18.
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warrants of old that permitted limitless searches, "[t]he insidious, far-
reaching and indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance-and,
most important, its capacity to choke off free human discourse that is
the hallmark of an open society-makes it almost, although not quite,
as destructive of liberty, as the 'kicked-in door.""'
These principles go as far back as Boyd v. United States, the
Court's first major interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.17  In
Boyd, the Court held that a person could not be compelled to
produce his own papers to be used as evidence against himself in
court." Doing so would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures,189 even though
there were no "circumstances of aggravation" on the government's
part, such as breaking down doors or opening drawers without a
warrant.'9 The Court stressed that "[ilt is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is [in] the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property."' 9
Although the Court in Boyd tied the right of privacy to private
property, the underlying principle was that unless the "papers or
effects" or whatever else the government wanted to seize was
contraband or instruments of a crime, they may not be reached by
any warrant or seized by the police.9  If they were seized, the
government could not use them in evidence.9 The Court noted that
this was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrants in
England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended
to protect against invasions of the "sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of his life" from searches under indiscriminate, general
186. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 388 (1974) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 209 (1961) (Frankfurter, J,
dissenting)).
187. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1739, 1740 (2000). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928)
(describing United States v. Boyd as the decision that "will be remembered as long as civil
liberty lives in the United States").
188. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
189. The Boyd Court also held that compelling a person to produce his papers would
violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, but this aspect of the
Court's holding is not discussed in this Note. Id. at 633.
190. Id. at 630.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 623-24.
193. Id.
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authority.194 The notion that police could only search and seize
evidence that was contraband or instruments of a crime, and not
"mere evidence," became known as the mere evidence rule. 95
The mere evidence rule defined the legal scope of a search for
the next four decades, until the Supreme Court overturned it in
Warden v. Hayden.9 In Warden, the Court rejected the distinction
between the seizure of "mere evidence" (that is, items for evidentiary
purposes only) and the seizure of items that were instrumentalities,
fruits, or contraband.' 97 The Court found that, on its face, the Fourth
Amendment protected the "'right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects...,' without regard to the use to
which any of these things are applied."'1 98 The mere evidence rule
failed to protect this "right of the people" because individual privacy
could be infringed both by a search directed at "a purposely
evidentiary object" and a search directed at an instrumentality or fruit
of a crime, or contraband.199 That is, the Fourth Amendment protects
individual privacy whether the police conducted a search for "mere
evidence" or for fruits or instrumentalities of a crime, or for
contraband.20°
In his concurrence, Justice Fortas lamented the majority's
decision to strike down the mere evidence rule, which he saw as
essential to enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
194. Id. at 625-27, 630.
195. The mere evidence rule was articulated in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
309 (1921). The Court stated that:
[allthough search warrants have thus been used in many cases ever since the
adoption of the Constitution, and although their use has been extended from
time to time to meet new cases within the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at
common law and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases... they may not be
used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for
the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only when a
primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the
public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to
the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be
taken.
Id. (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623-24).
196. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1967).
197. Id. at 300.
198. Id. at 301 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
199. Id. at 301-02.
200. Id. at 306-07.
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general searches-the amendment's very purpose. 2° In doing so, the
majority had "needlessly destroy[ed], root and branch, a basic part of
liberty's heritage."2' In his dissent, Justice Douglas had harsher
words for the majority. Boyd, according to Justice Douglas, not only
established the requirements for a warrant, but also created a "zone
of privacy which no government official may enter."23 In striking
down the mere evidence rule, the Court had also whittled away at the
right that was at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment: the right
of an individual to be free from warrantless, indiscriminate searches.2"
Justice Douglas pointed out that:
[t]hose who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every
individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep
his affairs to himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that
the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the
time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with
others and decide the extent of that sharing. This is his
prerogative, not the States'. The Framers ... knew what police
surveillance meant and how the practice of rummaging through
one's personal effects could destroy freedom. 25
Despite the death of the mere evidence rule, the Court has held
in later cases that the Fourth Amendment prohibits "general
searches.''206 A warrantless search must be particularized and specify
exactly what must be seized, and it must be limited in scope to the
reasons the search was initiated.
The amended FISA, however, stands this basic rule on its head.
As mentioned above, the Executive may conduct FISA surveillance
for the primary purpose of collecting evidence to use in a criminal
prosecution, and may then share this information with law
enforcement officials. Law enforcement officials may then charge
persons-even third parties who were not originally targets of the
FISA surveillance-with ordinary crimes. The extension of criminal
charges to persons beyond the scope of the initial investigation is
201. Id. at 310-12 (Fortas, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 312.
203. Id. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 325.
205. Id. at 323-24.
206. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979) ("Nor does the
Fourth Amendment countenance open-ended warrants, to be completed while a search is
being conducted and items seized or after the seizure has been carried out.").
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essentially a twenty-first century reincarnation of the general warrant
and writ of assistance. 7 And like those historical procedures, today's
procedures under FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, violate the
Fourth Amendment because they are indiscriminate.
The Court's history of condemning indiscriminate searches or
seizures rests on the fact that such searches expose individuals to
interferences by government when there is simply no good reason to
do so. °8 Similarly, in the case of FISA surveillance, there is simply no
good reason to avoid the Constitutional protections of Title III when
the defendant will ultimately not be charged with a crime related to
the reason for the FISA authorization in the first place. The concern
about unjustified searches and seizures rests on the notion that every
citizen is entitled to security of his person and property unless and
until the government is able to provide an adequate justification. M
The second reason for the Court's condemnation of
indiscriminate searches and seizures is that they are conducted at the
discretion of the Executive, who may act "despotically and
capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seize., 210 The
concern is that the Executive would search and seize arbitrarily.
Thus, the whole reason for constitutional safeguards is to "condemn[]
the petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers.,
212
IV. The Solution
A. The Rebirth of the Mere Evidence Rule in FISA Cases
The solution proposed by this Note is for regular, non-secret
Article III courts to suppress FISA-obtained evidence when
introduced against a criminal defendant who has been charged solely
with an ordinary crime-that is, a crime unrelated to a significant
foreign intelligence purpose, the reason behind the FISA surveillance
in the first place. This would constitute an initiation of a twenty-first
century version of the mere evidence rule. Under this rule, any
evidence that is unrelated to the purpose of the FISA authorization in
the first place-foreign intelligence-constitutes "mere evidence" and
207. Amsterdam, supra note 186, at 411.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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must be suppressed for the constitutional reason discussed above: the
scope of the search and seizure is not commensurate with its purpose.
A mere evidence rule would deter the use of FISA for ordinary
prosecution. "If the alleged 'end run' around the Fourth Amendment
yields no usable evidence, then prosecutors would have little
incentive to improperly rush toward FISA. 2 3 The rule would also
alleviate the concern that the government may use FISA as a
substitute for normal criminal law enforcement and Title III "based
on trumped up evidence of a connection to a foreign threat" by
removing all motivation for employing such a tactic in the first
place.14
Furthermore, the rule would serve as a use limit that would
function, after the fact, in the same way that the now-defunct primary
purpose test functioned before the surveillance: by ensuring that
FISA evidence would only be used against a defendant with credible
ties to a foreign power and charged with the most serious national
security offenses.215 In working after the fact, the rule would avoid the
problems that led to the breakdown of "the wall" in the first place:
the sharing of information between intelligence agencies and law
enforcement would still occur, but the latter's use of such evidence
would be strictly limited. Although the rule does not completely
alleviate the risk that the government will still invade the privacy of
Americans, it would "diminish the Executive's ability to exploit that
intrusion" because the government would not be able to use that
evidence in court . 6
B. Applying the Mere Evidence Rule
The idea of applying a mere evidence rule in FISA cases would
not be completely novel. The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Chief
Judge Kozinki, which was endorsed by nine out of eleven judges
sitting en banc, recently applied a similar rule-albeit in a different
context-to the same problem addressed in this Note. The case,
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., dealt with the
federal investigation into steroid use by professional baseball
213. Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security Investigation:
Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61,103 (2006).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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players.27 The Ninth Circuit used the case as an opportunity to create
procedural safeguards that federal courts must follow when issuing
search warrants for electronically stored information. 8
In 2002, the FBI launched an investigation into the Bay Area
Lab Cooperative ("BALCO") because it was suspected of providing
steroids to professional baseball players. 219 At the same time, the
Major League Baseball Players Association and Major League
Baseball agreed to mandatory drug tests of all professional baseball
players.22 ' Administered by Comprehensive Drugs Testing ("CDT"),
an independent corporation, the program required all Major League
players to undergo urine tests for banned substances.22' The results,
which were confidential, were not to be used to convict or penalize
any particular player who tested positive, but rather were to be
assessed in the aggregate to determine whether more than five
percent of the players were using banned substances; if so, additional
testing in future seasons would be required.222
After learning that ten baseball players had tested positive for
steroid use, the FBI obtained a subpoena from the Northern District
of California for "all 'drug testing records and specimens"' of the
baseball players in CDT's possession.223 The baseball players and
CDT moved to quash the subpoenas.2 On the same day that the
motion to quash was filed, the FBI obtained a warrant-this time
from the Central District of California-that authorized a search of
CDT's records.225 The warrant, unlike the subpoena, contained an
important limitation: it prohibited the government from searching the
records of persons other than the ten baseball players for whom the
FBI had probable cause to believe had taken banned substances.226 In
executing the warrant, however, the government searched and seized
217. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-
55354, 2009 WL 2605378, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2009).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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the records not just of those ten players, but of hundreds of
professional baseball players."7
The government's disregard for the narrow scope of the warrant,
as well as its indiscriminate rummaging through electronic databases
for evidence, is similar to the problem discussed in this Note: How
should courts treat evidence of criminal activity that the government
seizes pursuant to a warrant, when that criminal activity was not
within the scope of the warrant? In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the
government searched hundreds of electronic records in order to
locate records of ten baseball players for whom it had probable cause
to seize. But it also seized the records of hundreds of other people
under the "plain view" doctrine. The records, all contained in one
electronic directory, contained a vast number of drug test results, not
only of the ten players for whom the FBI had probable cause, but also
of hundreds of professional baseballs players, other sports
organizations, and a non-sporting entity.229 Other than the bad luck of
having their tests stored in the same computer as the ten baseball
players named on the warrant, many of these third parties were
completely unrelated.2 °
Similarly, FISA permits the government to search and seize-
usually in the form of electronic surveillance-information unrelated
to the purpose of the FISA warrant, as well as to obtain information
about third parties not named as targets of surveillance in the FISA
warrant. As long as the FBI is able to articulate a "significant"
foreign intelligence purpose for the investigation at the very outset-
based perhaps on only the slightest ties to a foreign power or its
agent-the government may conduct surveillance not only on the
FISA target, but also on any other third party unfortunate enough to
share the target's trunk line: the line of communication between the
communications carrier and a network of telephones, computers, and
fax machines.231 Thus, a FISA warrant issued for one person would
require the review of a large number of electronic communications
belonging to unrelated third parties, which the government could-
using the same argument of plain view that it did in Comprehensive
227. Id.
228. Id. at *6.
229. Id. at *14.
230. Id. at *14.
231. Pollak, supra note 17, at 259-60.
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Drug Testing-then use as evidence against defendants charged with
ordinary crimes.
The government's main argument in Comprehensive Drug
Testing is that law enforcement officials are justified in going beyond
the scope of a warrant because of its inability to locate and seize the
objects of the search without revealing the electronic files of others. 32
The government would likely make this same argument in response
to complaints that FISA searches netted evidence and third parties
well beyond the initial scope of the FISA warrant. According to the
government, if evidence of crimes is discovered during the search, the
evidence may be seized under the plain view doctrine.33 Under the
plain view doctrine, law enforcement officials may constitutionally
seize evidence in plain view if, first, the seizing officer is lawfully
located in a place from which the evidence can be seen; second, the
seizing officer himself has a lawful right of access to evidence; 4 and
third, the seizing officer has probable cause to believe that the
evidence in plain view is incriminating in nature.35 In Comprehensive
Drug Testing, however, the Ninth Circuit found the government's
conduct impermissible and explicitly rejected its plain view
argument.23
Rejecting the government's argument about the plain view
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit established guidelines to ensure that a
search warrant for electronic data does not "become a vehicle for the
government to gain access to data which it has no probable cause to
collect., 237  Among those guidelines is a requirement that the
government "forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine or any
similar doctrine that would allow it to retain data to which it has
gained access only because it was required to segregate seizable from
non-seizable data." 238 Should the government refuse to waive the use
of the plain view doctrine, the "judge should order that the seizable
232. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 2009 WL 2605378, at *3-4.
233. Id. at *6.
234. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,118-19 (1986).
235. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (finding that "the extension of the original justification [for the
search] is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges").
236. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 2009 WL 2605378, at *6-7.
237. Id. at *15.
238. Id. at *7.
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and non-seizable data be separated by an independent third party
under the supervision of the court, or deny the warrant altogether.,
239
Furthermore, the government must destroy or return any data that
does not fall within the scope of the warrant to the party from whom
the government obtained it.
21
The Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion suggests that the
government's justification of "plain view" may be unworkable not
only in the context of a search of electronic records, but also in the
context of FISA surveillance. The Ninth Circuit's guidelines would
have the same effect when applied to criminal cases as the mere
evidence rule advocated in this Note: the government would not be
permitted to use in court any evidence that is unrelated to the original
scope of the warrant.
The mere evidence rule, if applied to FISA cases, would restore
the judiciary to its rightful role as the enforcer of the Fourth
Amendment by allowing federal judges to limit and regulate
Executive surveillance. For example, a defendant challenging the
admission of FISA evidence may be successful if the judge determines
that the crime has only a weak connection to the foreign intelligence
purpose specified in the FISA order. Thus, evidence that the
defendant trafficked drugs for own profit, rather than channeling the
proceeds to fund a terrorist organization, would constitute "mere
evidence" and would be excluded. Under this rule, however, the
actual narcotics-if found pursuant to the FISA warrant-could be
rightfully seized as contraband, but could not be used against the
defendant charged solely with narcotics trafficking.
Conclusion
The amended FISA increases the risk that the government will
use new technologies to intrude into the lives of citizens to an
unprecedented degree. The guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures "was written and should be read to assure that any and
every form of such interference is at least regulated by fundamental
law so that it may be 'restrained within proper bounds."'2"' In order
to keep us from sliding back to a time when the abuse of individual
privacy under general warrants was the norm, courts must prohibit
239. Id.
240. Id. at *9.
241. Amsterdam, supra note 186, at 400 (citation omitted).
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the use of FISA fruits in criminal prosecutions that have no relation
to the reason for the interference in the first place.
